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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This is an appeal of an Order granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of Defendants - Appellees in the Third District Court of the 
State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Judge James S. Sawaya, 
presiding. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 




STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this matter are: 
A. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Appellants suffered a compensable personal 
injury? 
B. Whether the immediate injuries suffered by Appellants 
was sufficient to entitle them to compensation for 
those injuries and for emotional distress? 
C. Whether Appellants should be entitled to medical 
surveillance damages due to their exposure to asbestos? 
2 
V. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE: RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The determinative rule in this case is Rule 56(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: fl (b) A party against 
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
as to all or any part thereof•" 
3 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On February 10, 1989 the Appellants filed suit, seeking 
damages on six causes of action including: Common Law Fraud, 
Negligence, Strict Liability, Negligent Misrepresentation, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Reckless 
Disregard/Punitive Damages. (Complaint at Para. 35-61) (R.008-
015) . 
2. On February 22, 1990, the Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Appellants1 causes 
of action with prejudice. On May 21, 1990 that motion was 
granted by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge. 
(R.546) (R.541). 
3. The Appellants1 Complaint was dismissed with prejudice 
on the ground that no bodily injury had been manifested in any 
Appellant, however, Appellants were granted leave to re-file a 
complaint in the event that a bodily injury manifested itself in 
the future. (R.547) Plaintiffs Hansen, Hilton, Mackintosh, 
Silcox and Vickers hereby appeal said judgment. 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During July, 1986 through November 1986, and for all 
relevant periods, Appellants Tom Hansen, Douglas A. Hilton, Mike 
Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox and Russell Vickers were employed by CCI 
Mechanical, Inc. CCI had contracted with Defendant Mountain Fuel 
Supply to perform renovation work for what is called a total 
energy project in the basement of Mountain Fuel's downtown Salt 
Lake office site. (Complaint at Para. 12.) (R.004). 
2. This energy project included the re-routing of asbestos 
insulated piping and equipment from an old set of turbines to a 
new set of turbines. This work was performed in a poorly 
ventilated, enclosed basement area. (Complaint at Para. 14.) 
(R.005). 
3. During the course of this work, in or about the end of 
August, 1986, brick insulation was removed from a breaching in 
the basement area, and thrown into a pile nearby; it was then 
moved and stacked in an adjacent walkway area. (Hansen Depo. at 
41.) (Exhibit MB") (R.450). 
4. When the Appellants first observed the insulation, they 
expressed concern as to its composition to CCI foreman Mike 
Mackintosh. In or about the end of August, 1986, Mr. Mackintosh 
asked Defendant Roger Morris if the insulation material was 
asbestos. Mr. Morris replied that the insulation was not 
asbestos, that it was in fact calcium silicate, and that all of 
the asbestos in the area had been removed seven years prior. 
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(Hilton Depo. at 60-61.) (Exhibit ffEff.) (Mackintosh Depo. at 
35.) (Exhibit "A") (R.441), (Complaint at Para. 21) (R.006). 
5. Subsequent to the removal of the insulation and 
stacking in the area of the breaching, the insulation was 
inadvertently crushed and tracked throughout the area by workers. 
(Silcox Depo. at 81.) (Exhibit "E".) (R.476). 
6. For the following six weeks to two months, Plaintiffs 
worked in the area where the insulation was stored, continually 
walking though it, crawling over it and inhaling the dust from 
it. (Hansen Depo. at 44.) (Exhibit "B".) (R.449). 
7. One weekend in September, 1986, the plant was shut down 
and all ventilation to the area of the breaching and crushed 
insulation was cut off. (Mackintosh Depo. at 30.) (Exhibit 
MA,f.) (R.440) . 
8. During this period of shutdown, the insulation, which 
had been reduced to a powdery substance, was airborne and the 
area looked like Ma dust storm11. The dust was so thick that the 
workers could taste it and had to take periodic breaks just to 
clean it out of their noses and mouths and get fresh air. 
(Hilton Depo. at 79, 81.) (Exhibit "E".) (R.476, 477), 
(Complaint at 23, 24, 27) (R.006). 
9. At this time, and throughout their exposures in the 
basement area, all of the Plaintiffs suffered coughing, 
respiratory distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye 
irritation. (Hilton Depo. at 31. (Exhibit "E") (R.475), (Vickers 
Depo. at 34.) (Exhibit MCH.) (R.458), (Hansen Depo. at 18.) 
6 
(Exhibit MBlf.) (R.448), (Silcox Depo. at 32.) (Exhibit lfD".) 
(R.468), (Complaint at 34.) (R.008). 
10. Toward the end of October or early November, 1986, 
Appellant Vickers again pointed out the insulating material, 
which had been scattered about the premises, to Defendant Roger 
Barrus, safety director for Mountain Fuel, and expressed concern 
that the material might be asbestos. (Vickers Depo. at 51) 
(Exhibit "C".) (R.459), (Responses to Plaintiffs1 First Set of 
Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company No. 
19.) (Exhibit ,fFM.) (R.483). 
11. Mr. Barrus had the material tested, and reported that 
the material did, in fact, contain 60-65% amosite asbestos and 
less than 1% chrysotile asbestos. (Responses to Plaintiffs1 
First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company No. 20) (Exhibit "F") (R.483) (Complaint at Para. 29) 
(R.007). Vickers immediately approached Defendant Morris about 
the presence of the asbestos at the renovation site and Morris 
once again denied that any asbestos was present. Morris became 
very upset when informed about Barrus1 finding of asbestos and 
severely reprimanded Vickers for consulting with Barrus, 
indicating that completion of the renovation project would now be 
delayed and Mountain Fuel would risk losing a tax credit if the 
project was not completed on schedule. (Complaint at 30, 31) 
(R.007). 
12. Subsequently, the asbestos was removed from the project 
by Power-master, Inc. (Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
7 
Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company No. 
22.) (Exhibit "F") (R.483) 
13. Since the time of the Appellants1 exposure to the 
insulation containing asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site, each 
has suffered from severe anxiety associated with the uncertainty 
of their future medical condition, and they all anticipate 
undergoing periodic testing for asbestos related disease. 
(Complaint at Para. 40, 46, 59) (R.010), (Hilton Depo. at 36-37) 
(R.266-267), (Plaintiff Hilton's Response to Defendants1 First 
Set of Interrogatories No. 26) (R.481-482), (Hilton Depo. at 31) 
(R.263), (Plaintiff Vickers1 Responses to Defendants1 First Set 
of Interrogatories No. 26.) (Exhibit "C") (R.461-462), (Vickers 
Depo. at 38-39) (R.324-325), (Plaintiff Hansen's Responses to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories No. 26.) (Exhibit "B") 
(R.451-452), (Hansen Depo. at 21-22) (R.245, 446), (Silcox Depo. 
at 40; Plaintiff Silcox's Responses to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories No. 26.) (Exhibit "D") (R.471), (Plaintiff 
Mackintosh's Responses to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories No. 26.) (Exhibit "A") (R.443), (Mackintosh 
Depo. at 73) (Exhibit "A") (R.442). 
14. In addition, Appellant Vickers continues to suffer from 
wheezing and shortness of breath, Appellant Hansen continues to 
suffer from shortness of breath and increased susceptibility to 
chest colds, and Appellant Silcox continues to suffer from 
congestion, coughing and shortness of breath, all due to exposure 
to the insulation containing asbestos. (Vickers Depo at Para. 
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34) (Exhibit "C") (R.458), (Hansen Depo. at 18) (Exhibit "B") 
(R.448), (Silcox Depo. at 32) (Exhibit "D") (R.468). 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this case, Mountain Fuel Supply Company knew, or 
should have known of the presence of toxic asbestos in their 
building. Mountain Fuel hired sub-contractors (Appellants' 
employer) to renovate their building. The renovation required 
that Appellants remove and work with asbestos in a confined 
basement area. When the Apellants inquired about the contents of 
the dust they were constantly exposed to, Mountain Fuel 
carelessly told them that the substance was a benign calcium 
silicate. 
The Appellants became nauseated and began coughing and 
developing various chest, eye and throat irritations. These 
problems worsened as the project continued. Appellants continued 
to breathe the asbestos dust over a two month period. Appellants 
finally confirmed that their workplace was indeed contaminated 
with high concentrations of asbestos. 
Appellants contend that their exposure to toxic asbestos is 
a present injury. Additionally, Appellants contend that their 
immediate symptoms, e.g. coughing, eye, nose and throat 
irritation and nausea were also immediate, compensable injuries 
justifying compensation. 
The long-term health problems associated with asbestos 
exposure are grim. Because of the uncertainty of asbestos-
related disease and death, Appellants are understandably 
suffering from emotional distress. This distress is clearly and 
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unmistakably due to their exposure to asbestos at the Mountain 
Fuel site. Consequently, Appellants seek compensation for their 
emotional distress. 
Appellants further contend that Mountain Fuel should be held 
responsible for the costs of monitoring the potential disease 
processes in each Appellant as a result of their exposure to 
asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site. The medical monitoring of 
toxic exposure victims is necessary and recognized as a 
compensatory item. Most courts award medical monitoring damages 
to help the victim mitigate the damages caused by toxic exposure. 
Numerous issues of material fact exist precluding 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. Such issues of fact 
include the extent of Appellants1 injuries, the extent of their 
emotional distress and the reasonableness thereof, the degree of 
exposure to asbestos and the Appellants' increased risk of future 
asbestos-related disease and the necessity for medical 
monitoring. 
Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the judgment of the Third District Court and remand this 




I. ASBESTOS AND ITS RELATED DISEASES 
In the United States it is estimated that one 
asbestos-related death occurs every hour. Note, Asbestos 
Litigation, 10 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 393, 396 (1985). Medical 
commentators have noted asbestos as the most hazardous 
occupational substance known. Id. Asbestos is a naturally 
occurring fibrous mineral silicate used principally in the 
construction industry. It is synonymous with insulation and 
cement products which comprise greater than 50% of the asbestos 
market. L. Parmeggiani, Encyclopedia Of Occupational Health and 
Safety 185, 187 (3rd Ed. 1983). The danger from the mineral 
arises from exposure to the finite dust particles. These fibrous 
silicates are so small as to be detectable only by an electron 
microscope. Id. at 186. Once inhaled the asbestos fibers enter 
the lung and become trapped forever causing scarring of the lung 
and initiating the process from which asbestos-related diseases 
result. 4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, Attorneys1 Textbook of Medicine, 
205C.11(2) (Apr. 1980). 
The threshold level of exposure required to trigger an 
asbestos related disease is unknown. L. Parmeggiani, supra, at 
185-195. The courts have recognized "evidence which indicates 
that short periods of exposure-from one day to three months-can 
cause significant damage to the lungs". Schultz v. Keene Corp. 
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729 F.Supp. 609, 615 (N.D.Ill.1990). "The length of time that an 
individual was exposed to asbestos does not in itself determine 
how serious the injury will be. Several factors, including 
individual idiosyncrasy, the intensity of exposure, and the 
nature of the contaminant all play a part in the development of 
the disease" Id. at 609 citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus, 
Inc. , 118 111.2d 23, 37, 112 111.Dec. 684, 690, 514 N.E.2d 150, 
156 (1987). The Fifth Circuit Court also recognized the dangers 
of any asbestos exposure when it stated that, "any exposure to 
asbestos, even to a relatively minute amount, can precipitate the 
development of an asbestos related disease." Jackson V. 
Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314, 1336 (5th Cir. 1985) (en Banc). 
The three primary diseases which are directly associated 
with asbestos exposure are lung cancer, asbestosis, and 
mesothelioma. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 
1076, 1082-83 (5th cir.1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 
S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974). At least 17 major studies 
conducted since 1955 have confirmed the relationship between 
asbestos exposure and lung or bronchial cancer. Becklake, 
Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lungs and Pluera, 126 Am. Rv. 
Resp. Dis. 187, 188 (1982). Lung cancer, of course, is virtually 
incurable. Id. at 189. 
Asbestosis is defined as fibrosis of the lung caused by 
asbestos fibers. Asbestosis is one of the three primary asbestos 
related diseases and results exclusively from exposure to 
asbestos. 4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, supra, at 205C.11(2). When 
13 
asbestos fibers enter the lung they become trapped and scar the 
lung. Id.. at 205C. 40-42. Once inhaled, the body's 
clearance-defense mechanism encases the invading asbestos dust 
fibers to protect the lung. This process results in a reduction 
of the limited surface area in which the carbon-doxide exchange 
takes place. As the surface area decreases the victim develops 
external signs of shortness of breath, wheezing and the inability 
to carry on normal activities. Id. No known medical treatment 
exists for removing the fibers or scarred sections of the lung. 
Id. Certainty of the diagnosis is confirmed by a chest 
radiograph and tests measuring lung capacity and maximum 
expiration. Asbestosis is frequently fatal. The correlation 
between asbestosis and cancer may be as high as 50%. L. 
Parmeggiani, supra, at 190. 
Mesothelioma is a cancerous tumor arising from the 
mesothelial cells in the chest, stomach and heart. 4 L. Gordy & 
R. Gray, supra at 205C.72. The diagnosis for mesothelioma is 
difficult since the symptoms for asbestosis and mesothelioma are 
identical. Diagnosis often requires biopsy of a surgically 
removed piece of tissue to distinguish it from asbestosis. Once 
diagnosed, it is uniformly fatal. Id. "Most patients survive for 
less than one year after a diagnosis." Mossman & Gee, Asbestos 
Related Diseases, 320 New Eng. J. Med. 1721, 1723; Locke v. 
Johns-Manville Corp.. 275 SE.2d 900, 903 (Va. 1981). 
Another critical factor in asbestos-related diseases is the 
long latency period between impact/exposure and the diagnosis of 
14 
the disease. Asbestosis is detectable as early as 4 years after 
exposure, but generally has a latency period of 15 to 20 years. 
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 434f 346 (Mo. 1984). 
Mesothelioma has a latency period of "35 to 40 years, with most 
deaths occurring in patients over 60 years of age." Mossman & 
Gee, supra, at 1723. This prolonged and unpredictable latency 
period adds to the insidious nature of the asbestos exposure and 
disease process. 
15 
II. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER 
APPELLANTS SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE PERSONAL INJURY. 
The Appellants claim to have suffered a compensable 
injury. It is not disputed that Appellants were exposed to large 
quantities of asbestos fibers at the Mountain Fuel site. The 
inhalation of toxic asbestos fibers has resulted in the invasion 
of Appellants1 legally protected interests and a physical 
invasion of their bodies. The Appellants1 exposure to asbestos 
is an "injury11 that is actionable if inflicted by a private 
person. "Injury" is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§7(1) (1965) as "the invasion of any legally protected interest 
of another." The Appellants have a legally protected interest in 
avoiding the inhalation of toxic asbestos fibers, the emotional 
distress caused by the fear of a potentially fatal disease, and 
the associated medical expenses necessary to monitor the disease 
process. 
In the case of Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 
525 A.2d 287 (1987), the New Jersey Court wrote: 
The word 'injury1 is used... to denote the fact 
that there has been an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which, if it were the legal consequence of a 
tortious act, would entitle the person suffering the 
invasion to maintain the action of tort. ...The most 
usual form of injury is the infliction of some harm, 
but there may be an injury although no harm is done. 
In our view, an enhanced risk of disease caused by 
significant exposure to toxic chemicals is clearly an 
injury under the act. 
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 304-05 (Citations omitted). In the same 
opinion, Justice Handler, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, writes, "it is self-evident that exposure to toxic 
16 
chemicals is the 'infliction of...harm, an invasion of a legally 
protected interest.111 Id. at 317. Furthermore, "The injury... 
is an event that has surely occurred; it is not a speculative or 
remote possible happening. Among the consequences of this 
unconsented-to invasion ... a tangible risk of major disease." 
Id. at 319. Appellants1 exposure to asbestos in this case is a 
tortious event that surely has occurred. Asbestos is the toxic 
invader and the defendants are responsible for the unconsented-to 
exposure and resulting injuries. 
This view of injuries is also supported by Friends for All 
Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). Medical surveillance damages were awarded to 
children who were exposed to the sudden depressurization of an 
aircraft cabin. The Court wrote, "It is difficult to dispute 
that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive 
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in 
avoiding physical injury." Id. at 826. 
In addition to an invasion of Appellants1 legal interests of 
avoiding emotional distress, increased risk of disease and 
expensive diagnostic examinations, Appellants have suffered 
actual physical injury. Although Appellants do not yet have 
cancer or diagnosed asbestosis, they have been exposed to 
asbestos, suffered respiratory distress and other reactions, and 
as a result have suffered an immediate injury. The Court in 
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th cir. 
1985), held that mere exposure to asbestos was sufficient to 
17 
establish an "injury" in the form of "inhalation of fibers and 
the invasion of his body by those fibers". Id. at 1137, 
In Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 
1982) , the court held that mere ingestion of contaminated water 
was an injury, although the plaintiffs suffered no physical 
symptoms from drinking the toxic water. The court stated, "If 
the plaintiffs ingested any amount of the toxic substance, it is 
the judgment of the court that it is at least a technical 
physical injury." Id. at 434. In the present case, Appellants 
have inhaled a toxic substance over the course of months; they 
have incurred an injury. Appellants should now be allowed to 
recover for that injury. 
Another theory adopted by some courts for finding present 
injury when the plaintiff has no symptoms of cancer or asbestosis 
is that exposure to toxic substances results in subcellular and 
genetic injuries. This was the position of the Court in Brafford 
v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp 14 (D.C. Colo. 1984), where 
factual allegations of cellular and subcellular damage satisfied 
the present injury requirement for an increased risk of cancer 
claim. Brafford was a case of exposure to known carcinogens with 
no present physical injuries. The Federal District Court of 
Colorado in Brafford also found that a material issue of fact 
existed as to the presence of such cellular injuries precluding 
summary judgment. 586 F.Supp. at 18. It is an established 
medical fact that once the toxic asbestos fibers enter the body 
they remain there forever. L. Gordy & R . Gray, supra at 
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205C.11(2). "Indeed, asbestosis, caused by inhalation of 
asbestos fibers, begins when asbestos fibers become embedded in 
the lung11. Eacrle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 
527, (Fla. App. Dist. 1985) citing Todd Shipyard Corp v. Black, 
717 F.2d 1280, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1983). In the present case, 
Appellants have also been exposed to a known carcinogen. The 
cellular level injuries sustained by the Appellants have yet to 
be established, but they have undoubtedly occurred. Just as in 
Brafford, this Court must recognize the subcellular and genetic 
injuries as a present injury. This injury resulted from the 
Appellants exposure to asbestos at the hands of Mountain Fuel. 
Another means by which courts have recognized a present 
injury where toxic tort victims do not yet have cancer or 
asbestosis is explained in Hacrerty v. L & L Marine Services, 
Inc., 788 F.2d 315 reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) and 
Villari v. Terminex, 663 F.Supp 727 (E.D.Pa. 1987). In both of 
these cases nominal symptoms such as dizziness, general malaise, 
headache and nausea were sufficient to establish present injury. 
In Haqerty the Plaintiff was a tankerman who was drenched with 
known carcinogenic chemicals. He experienced the physical 
symptoms of dizziness, leg cramps and a stinging sensation in his 
extremities. Hagerty brought suit seeking damages for his 
enhanced risk of disease, emotional distress associated with the 
fear of contracting cancer, and for the costs of medical 
examination to help in early detection of the disease. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. 788 
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F.2d at 316. The Court of Appeals reversed and recognized 
Plaintiffs1 claims for emotional distress and medical 
surveillance damages. The Court held that these causes of action 
were cognizable because plaintiffs's injury was "discernible on 
the occasion when he was drenched with the toxic chemicals" and 
that he was therefore "entitled to recover damages for all of his 
past, present and probable future harm attributable to 
defendant's tortious conduct." Id. at 317. 
The Plaintiffs in Villari were exposed to the termicide 
Aldin, which is "considered a cancer causing chemical in man", 
when it was negligently spilled in their basement. 663 F.Supp. 
at 728. The Plaintiffs testified to physical symptoms of 
headaches, nausea, dizziness and general malaise in the month 
after the spill. Id. at 728. Concerning the issue of present 
physical "injury" from which to recover damages, the court wrote, 
"we have found that there is sufficient medical evidence on 
record to permit a jury to conclude that the Villaris suffered 
physical injury from Aldrin exposure". Id. at 735. These 
general symptoms were sufficient "injury " to support a claim for 
medical surveillance damages. 
The present case is similar to the issues addressed in 
Haaerty and Villari. Appellants have suffered general symptoms 
of asbestos exposure including coughing, wheezing, shortness of 
breath, nausea and headaches, among other complaints. The 
Appellants have suffered a tortious event; the unconsented 
exposure to a known carcinogen. As a result, the Appellants have 
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suffered emotional distress, an increased risk of future disease 
and the necessity of medical expenses to monitor the disease 
process which began with the invasion of asbestos fibers. 
All of the preceding cases represent four theories under 
which recovery has been allowed and the "injury" requirement met. 
Toxic tort victims face almost insurmountable legal barriers in 
bringing suit for exposure to toxic substances. To recover 
damages, courts use the traditional tort doctrine that requires 
plaintiffs to plead and prove a present injury. The problem is 
that few toxic tort victims suffer an immediate, medically 
verifiable disease due to the long latency period between the 
exposure to the toxin and detection of the disease. These four 
theories represent ways in which the courts have overcome the 
present injury barrier, and allowed toxic tort victims to recover 
for their harms. See, Christiansen, Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp.: Emotional Distress Damages for the Duration of 
Toxic Exposure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 759 (1989) ; Note, Medical 
Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation 
of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind. L. J. 849 (1988). 
Because the issue of toxic torts and the inherent 
characteristics of latent disease manifestation is a relatively 
new area of the law, the case law is varied in it's approach to 
physical injury. Whichever theory of recovery this Court favors, 
the fact that the Appellants have suffered an injury cannot be 
denied. As Justice Handler observed, "The risk of major 
disease...is unquestionably greater than that experienced by 
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persons not similarly exposed to toxic chemicals". Ayers, 525 
A.2d at 319. Justice Handler further noted "no person in her 
right mind would trade places with any one of these plaintiffs". 
Id. at 320. Indeed Appellants have experienced an injury and 
should be compensated. 
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III. THE IMMEDIATE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANTS ARE 
SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE THEM TO COMPENSATION FOR THOSE INJURIES. 
Each of the Appellants have clearly testified to and 
described immediate injuries including severe coughing, 
respiratory distress, chest tightness, headaches, severe eye 
irritations and nausea; all symptoms of having inhaled large 
quantities of asbestos fibers. 4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, supra, 
205C.11(2). Asbestos fibers will remain trapped in each of the 
Appellant's lungs forever, causing scarring and possibly 
asbestosis and lung cancer. Id. 205C.11(2). "The injury 
involved is an actual event: exposure to toxic chemicals. The 
tortious contamination, moreover, is an event that has surely 
occurred; it is not a speculative or remote possible happening. 
Among the consequences of this unconsented-to invasion ... is a 
tangible risk of a major disease." Ayers, 525 A.2d at 319. (J. 
Handler, dissenting opinion). The injury in the present case was 
wholly unconsented-to. The Appellants asked on numerous 
occasions the contents of the 60% asbestos material they were 
working with and the resulting dust they were inhaling. The 
Defendants withheld information, and claimed the contents to be 
benign. The Appellants discovered the asbestos through their 
own initiative and refused to work with the asbestos once it was 
discovered. Professional asbestos removers, who use protective 
clothing, were subsequently employed to remove the hazardous 
material. 
"But for " the Defendants actions, the Appellants would not 
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have been exposed to asbestos and suffered immediate injuries in 
the form of their coughing, headaches, nausea and eye irritation. 
At a very minimum, Appellants should be compensated for these 
immediate injuries. 
IV. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVERY FOR INFLICTION OF SEVERE 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND FEAR OF CANCER. 
Since victims of asbestos related diseases have 
difficulty proving causation and the presence of a compensable 
injury, courts frequently allow recovery based on a theory of 
mental distress. Although no Utah Court has ever addressed the 
issue of asbestos exposure, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes 
causes of action for infliction of severe emotional distress. A 
person "who intentionally causes severe emotional distress to 
another through extreme and outrageous conduct is liable to that 
person for any resulting damages." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985). Neither bodily nor physical injury is 
required. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). 
Recently, Utah has recognized a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Johnson v. Rogers, 
763 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1988). Indeed, application of the tests set 
out by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson justify recovery for 
infliction of emotional distress in this case. In Johnson, the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted a "zone of danger" rule. Johnson, 763 
P.2d at 778-784. In adopting the zone of danger rule, the Court 
relied upon §313 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes 
emotional distress to another, he is subject to 
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liability to the other for resulting illness or 
bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his 
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing 
the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the 
harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from 
facts known to him, should have realized that the 
distress, if it were caused, might result in 
illness or bodily harm. 
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 780. 
In the present case Defendants were negligent in 
allowing Appellants to work in an enclosed, poorly ventilated 
area with a known carcinogenic material and have thereby 
caused Plaintiffs1 emotional distress. Defendants had a 
"duty" to provide Appellants with a work place free from 
known hazards. Defendants were under the "duty to warn them 
of any danger in coming thereon which he knows of or ought to 
know of, and of which they are not aware. One going upon 
anotherfs property as an independent contractor ... is an 
invitee to whom the property owner is liable for an injury 
occasioned by the unsafe condition of the premises 
encountered in the work." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent 
Contractors §27 (1964). 
Defendants breached that duty when they told Appellants, 
despite repeated inquiries, that the material they were 
forced to work in and inhale was a benign calcium silicate 
when in fact it was toxic asbestos. The asbestos was on the 
Mountain Fuel property and contaminated the Appellants 
workspace. Defendants knew or should have known about the 
asbestos, particularly in light of the claim that all 
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asbestos had been previously removed. It cannot seriously be 
disputed that Defendants were aware of the risks posed by 
asbestos and knew that the building contained asbestos. 
Mountain Fuel should have been on the alert that the 
insulating material was asbestos and provided adequate 
protection and warnings to the workers. 
Defendants1 negligence in failing to provide a safe 
workplace is the proximate cause of Appellants1 emotional 
distress. "But for" Defendants1 negligence, Appellants would 
not be suffering from the emotional distress of having been 
exposed to harmful and potentially deadly toxins. 
The "zone of danger" rule is met by the facts in the 
instant case. The Defendants should have realized that their 
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress, 
because of their knowledge of the potential harm. Defendants 
knew of the potential harms related to asbestos exposure. 
From the facts generally known about asbestos, the Defendants 
should have realized that such distress might result in 
illness or bodily harm to Appellants. 
A more stringent rule, "the impact rule", is also 
satisfied by Appellants in the instant case. In 
Eaqle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) , the "impact rule" satisfied the showing 
of a physical injury required for recovery for emotional 
distress. In Eaqle-Picher the plaintiff had been exposed to 
asbestos products. The Court determined that mere 
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"inhalation of asbestos satisfies the impact rule". Id. at 
527. The Court wrote, "The essence of the impact, then, it 
seems is that the outside force or substance, no matter how 
large or small, visible or invisible, and no matter that the 
effects are not immediately deleterious, touch or enter the 
plaintiff's body." Id. A plaintiff, therefore, need not 
show physical injury, just exposure to a toxic substance, in 
order to recover damages. Id. The court reached this 
conclusion by reasoning that inhalation of smoke has been 
sufficient injury and invasion to constitute an impact. Id 
at 526. It was further noted that, "surely, the embedding of 
asbestos fibers in the lungs is no less an impact than the 
microscopic intrusion of tubercule bacilli into the body 
found to have satisfied the impact rule in Plummer v. United 
States." Id. at 527 (citation omitted). Clearly, the 
inhalation of asbestos fibers satisfies the "impact rule". 
Victims of toxic torts recovered for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress in the recent case of 
Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 
(Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1990). In Potter, property owners sued 
when they discovered hazardous materials dumped nearby had 
contaminated their water supply. The Potter court held that 
plaintiffs could "recover for NIED [Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress] even in the absence of physical injury." 
Id. at 890, relying on Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 
27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980). The 
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Potter Court said that the "essence" of plaintiffs distress 
"is that a cancer-causing substance has entered their bodies 
and therefore made them more susceptible to future physical 
injury. In other words the security of their person has been 
jeopardized" 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891. In regards to the issue 
of unsubstantiated claims, the court said, "it is apparent 
that these circumstances [exposure to toxic substances] 
provide a certain guarantee that respondents1 fear is 
genuine." Id. 
Many courts have granted relief to toxic tort victims 
for emotional distress. Haqerty v. L.& L. Marine Serv.. 
Inc. , 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986); Merry v. Westincrhouse 
Elec. Corp.,684 F.Supp. 852 (M.D.Pa. 1988); Wetherill v. 
University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D.I11. 1983); 
Villari v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.Pa. 
1987) ; 
The Courts have also allowed victims of asbestos 
exposure to prove emotional distress from exposure based upon 
(1) Cancerphobia and (2) the fear of contracting cancer. 
Both theories of mental distress seek to avoid the 
traditional common law requirement of present physical injury 
as a condition precedent to a personal injury action. 
Cancerphobia, a recognized psychiatric illness, is the 
present anxiety over developing cancer in the future. Gayle 
and Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of 
Cancer, 15 Cum. L. Rev. 723, 730 (1985). Many Courts have 
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recognized cancerphobia as evidence of severe emotional 
distress. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 
(N.J. Super. 1985). Recovery for cancerphobia was first 
recognized in Ferrara v. Gallucio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 
249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). Ferrara was a medical 
malpractice action wherein the Plaintiff recovered for her 
emotional distress stemming from her cancerphobia. 152 
N.E.2d at 251. 
The New Jersey Court in Devlin set out four standards to 
be met in determining recoverability for cancerphobia or a 
fear of cancer claim. 
(1) Plaintiff is currently suffering from 
serious fear or emotional distress or a clinically 
diagnosed phobia of cancer. (2) The fear was 
proximately caused by exposure to asbestos. (3) 
Plaintiff's fear of getting cancer due to their 
exposure is reasonable. (4) Defendants are 
legally responsible for Plaintiff's exposure to 
asbestos. 
Devlin, 495 A.2d at 499. 
A. Appellants Are Currently Suffering From Serious Fear or 
Emotional Distress. 
It is clear from the testimony of each of the 
Appellants in their depositions as well as their Responses to 
Interrogatories that each Appellant suffers severe emotional 
distress from the fear of developing future cancer and 
asbestos related disease. 
B. The Fear Was Proximately Caused By Appellant's Exposure 
To Asbestos At The Mountain Fuel Site. 
Such fears include the fear of contraction of 
mesothelioma, a fatal cancer, which is exclusively caused by 
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asbestos. But for Appellants' exposure to asbestos at the 
Mountain Fuel site, the Appellants would not be suffering 
emotional distress regarding an increased fear of contraction 
of cancer and/or asbestos related disease. 
C. Appellants' Fear of Contracting Cancer As A Result Of 
Their Exposure To Asbestos At The Mountain Fuel Site Is 
Reasonable. 
It is clear from the Statement of Facts supra that the 
level of exposure to asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site was 
unconscionably high. It is common knowledge that asbestos is 
a known carcinogen and that asbestosis and mesothelioma are 
feared throughout the country. Considering the heinous 
consequences of contraction of an asbestos related disease, 
it is certainly reasonable that Appellants fear contracting 
such diseases. 
D. Defendants Are Legally Responsible For Appellants' 
Exposure. 
As the owner of the building and the employer of the 
contractor and subcontractors at the project, Mountain Fuel 
had a legal responsibility to protect Appellants from being 
exposed to substances which are known to cause debilitating 
disease and death. There is no justification whatsoever for 
Mountain Fuel's failure to advise Appellants and their 
employers of the asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site. This is 
especially true given the fact that Appellants brought the 
material containing over 60% asbestos to the attention of 
Mountain Fuel's employees and agents early on and were 
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assured that it was merely calcium silicate. Defendants do 
not (because they cannot) deny legal responsibility for 
Plaintiffs1 exposure to the asbestos in this case. 
Numerous cases have allowed recovery for fear of cancer 
and/or cancerphobia. Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 542 
A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ad. 1988); Devlin v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. I 1985); Eagle-Picher 
Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 S.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985). 
Genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary 
judgment on Appellants1 claim for emotional distress. The 
extent of Appellants' past and current emotional distress and 
its source is an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact as 
well as the reasonableness of such fears. The Molien Court 
stated, "the jurors are best situated to determine whether 
and to what extent the defendants conduct caused emotional 
distress...To repeat: this is a matter of proof to be 
presented to the trier of fact." 616 P.2d at 821. 
Additionally, material issues of fact exist as to the level 
of exposure at the Mountain Fuel site and the degree of 
inhalation and ingestion of asbestos by Appellants. "It is 
for the Jury to decide questions such as the existence, 
severity and reasonableness of the fear." Hagerty, 788 F.2d 
at 318. Consequently, Summary Judgment for Defendants should 
be reversed, and the Appellants should be given their day in 
court. 
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V. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE 
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS. 
The early detection of carcinogenic-exposure 
diseases is considered by the vast majority of medical 
authorities to be essential in the effective treatment of 
disease and enhances the victim's chances of survival. Evers 
v. Dollinger, 9 N.J. 399, 424 & n.2, 471 A.2d 405, 419 & n.2 
(1984). Courts have noted the irreparable harm that may 
result from delayed diagnosis and treatment. Barth v. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 661 F. Supp. 193, (N. D. Cal. 
1987) . Early detection is accomplished by periodic testing 
and screening of individuals exposed to toxic substances. 
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. at 599 n. 12, 525 
A. 2d at 309 n.12. Courts have held that these damages are 
not speculative. They are based on objectively, and 
specifically, determinable medical necessities. Id. at 312. 
A recent line of cases has established three elements 
which the plaintiff must prove to recover medical 
surveillance damages. These three requirements were 
suggested in Ayers, 525 A. 2d at 313 and were later followed 
by Merry v. Westincrhouse Elec. Corp. , 684 F.Supp. 847, 850 
(M.D.Pa. 1988), Habitants Against Landfill Toxants v. City 
of York, No. 84-5-3820, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20937 (York Co. May 
20, 1985) and Villari v. Terminix, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 727, 735 
n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1987). These elements are: "(1) Exposure to 
hazardous substances; (2) the potential for injury; and (3) 
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the need for early detection." Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 850. 
It is really not disputed that Appellants have been 
exposed to a hazardous substance through the negligence of 
the Defendants. For purposes of Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Defendants have admitted that Appellants 
were exposed to asbestos on their property. (See, Tr. 1-2). 
As a proximate result of their exposure to asbestos, 
Appellants have a substantially increased risk of manifesting 
a serious asbestos related disease requiring them to undergo 
medical surveillance examinations. This element is more 
difficult to prove because the medical community is unable to 
quantify the risks toxic exposure plaintiffs face. Merry, 
684 F.Supp. at 850-851. The Merry Court wrote extensively 
concerning this issue and arrived at the same standard that 
the Ayers court established. Ayers states that any 
increased risk is sufficient to justify medical surveillance 
damages. The Court wrote, "Even if the likelihood that these 
plaintiffs would contract cancer were only slightly higher 
than the national average, medical intervention may be 
completely appropriate." Ayers, 525 A. 2d at 312. The 
potential diseases for which the Appellants now run an 
increased risk are extremely serious and life threatening. 
Cancer, asbestosis and mesothelioma are the common deadly 
results of exposure to asbestos. 
"As to the third requirement, there is not a serious 
question of the value of early detection and the treatment of 
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cancer." Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 850. "A survey of the 
medical literature indicated that it is universally agreed 
that delay in cancer diagnosis and treatment usually 
increases the risk of metastasis." Evers, 471 A. 2d at 405. 
Consequently, there is no doubt whatsoever that Appellants 
have a desperate need to detect any asbestos related disease 
as early as possible. 
Appellants may also recover under another theory of 
compensation for future medical surveillance damages because 
their legally protected interest in avoiding medical 
surveillance expenses has been invaded by the Defendants. 
"But for" the Appellants1 exposure to asbestos, they would 
not require medical surveillance. While this injury is not 
an actual physical injury, it is no less an invasion of a 
legally protected interest justifying compensation. This 
position is strongly supported by Friends for All Children, 
Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where 
the court awarded surveillance damages absent a manifested 
physical injury. The Court stated: 
It is difficult to dispute that an individual 
has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic 
examinations just as he or she has an interest in 
avoiding physical injury. When the defendant 
negligently invades this interest, the injury to 
which is neither speculative nor resistant to 
proof, it is elementary that the defendant should 
make the plaintiff whole by paying for the 
examinations." 
Friends, 746 F.2d at 826. Future medical damages 
compensation, without a present physical injury was similarly 
34 
upheld in Hagertv v. L & L Marine Services, Inc. where the 
plaintiff was soaked with chemicals while on duty. He was 
awarded the costs of future diagnostic checks and medical 
examinations to ensure the early detection of a possible 
cancerous condition. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986). 
The Arizona Appellate Court found surveillance damages 
necessary and applicable to asbestos exposure in Burns v. 
Jacpaays Min. Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d. 28 (Ariz. App. 
1987) . In Burns, residents were exposed to asbestos but 
showed no clinically manifested signs of asbestos-related 
disease. The Court recognized the increased risk of disease 
the plaintiff faced, however, and awarded medical 
surveillance damages. The Court stated that "surveillance to 
monitor the effects of exposure to toxic chemicals is 
reasonable and necessary." Burns, 156 Ariz, at 381, 752 
P.2d. at 33. 
Many other Courts have upheld Medical surveillance 
damages for toxic tort victims. Herber v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Askey v. Occidental 
Chemical Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 102 A.D.2d 130 (1984); 
Mauro v. Owens-Cornincr Fibercrlas Corp., 225 N.J.Super. 196, 
542 A.2d 16 (1988); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 202 
N.J.Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985); Barth v. Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Co. , 661 F. Supp. 193, (N. D. Cal. 1987). 
Medical surveillance damages have been upheld by courts 
because of the strong medical and legal justifications. 
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Additionally, Courts recognize the compelling public policy 
interests of just compensation for victims, deterrence and 
early disease detection. 
Allowing recovery for medical surveillance damages 
fulfills the tort system's deterrent function by subjecting 
tort feasors to immediate and significant liability. Avers, 
106 N.J. at 579, 525 A. 2d at 311-12. The victims difficulty 
in recovering damages when the latent disease manifests 
itself lessens. Such recoveries also deter irresponsible 
behavior. Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 
99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1630 (1986). "The primary purpose of 
the tort law is that wronged persons should be compensated 
for their injuries and that those responsible for the wrong 
should bear the cost of their tortious conduct. Moreover, 
forcing tort feasors to pay for the harm they have wrought 
provides a proper incentive for reasonable conduct.... Those 
who cause injuries should be required to pay for them." 
Ayers 106 N.J. at 585, 525 A.2d at 319 (citation omitted). 
Awarding medical surveillance damages furthers the 
public interests of early detection and treatment of disease. 
Early detection benefits the victims by mitigating the 
personal injuries they suffer and ultimately reduces the 
Defendants1 liability. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at 
311-312. Early detection also fosters public health interest 
in providing "access to medical testing for individuals whose 
exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of 
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disease. The value of early diagnosis and treatment for 
cancer patients is well documented." Burns, 156 Ariz, at 
382, 752 P.2d at 33. Additionally, the lack of reimbursement 
for toxic exposure unjustly effects the individual and 
offends public policy, because a victim who does not have the 
financial means for medical intervention must necessarily 
forego diagnostic testing. Ayers, 106 N.J.at 579, 525 A.2d 
at 311. 
Diagnostic testing may also be required by law in order 
to recover for the future diseases appellants develop. The 
•avoidable consequence rule1 requires that a plaintiff submit 
to any treatment that is medically advisable. "Failure to do 
so rna^ bar future recovery for a condition he could thereby 
have alleviated or avoided." Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 
A.2d at 310-311. Appellants exposure to asbestos has 
increased their risk of contracting serious disease sometime 
in the future. "But for" Appellant's unconsented-to 
exposure, they would not have the greatly increased risk of 
contracting asbestosis or mesothelioma. Case law supports 
Appellants claim that pre-symptom diagnostic testing is 
medically advisable for plaintiffs exposed to toxic 
substances. Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 851; Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d 
at 247, 102 A.d.2d at 137; Mauro, 225 N.J.Super at 198, 542 
A. 2d at 18. There is sufficient evidence before the court 
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
requirements for recovering medical surveillance damages, 
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including Appellants1 increased risk of major disease and the 
necessity of medical monitoring. Consequently, Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed and Appellants 
should be allowed to pursue their claims further. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is clear that numerous genuine 
issues of material fact exist in this case precluding summary 
judgment. It is also clear that Appellants have suffered an 
injury for which they are entitled to compensation as a 
matter of law. It is undisputed that Appellants were exposed 
to clouds of toxic asbestos on the property of Mountain Fuel. 
As a result of this unconsented-to exposure, Appellants have 
suffered invasion of their legally protected interests and 
their bodies. Appellants suffer from the increased risk of 
fatal disease and reasonable emotional distress. Appellants 
are entitled to damages for these injuries including 
compensation for the necessary costs of medical monitoring. 
This case presents many issues of material fact, and this 
Court should now reverse and remand this case to the lower 
court for further proceedings. / 
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